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Abstract—Instruction set randomization (ISR) was initially
proposed with the main goal of countering code-injection attacks.
However, ISR seems to have lost its appeal since code-injection
attacks became less attractive because protection mechanisms
such as data execution prevention (DEP) as well as code-reuse
attacks became more prevalent.
In this paper, we show that ISR can be extended to also protect
against code-reuse attacks while at the same time offering security
guarantees similar to those of software diversity, control-flow in-
tegrity, and information hiding. We present Scylla, a scheme that
deploys a new technique for in-place code encryption to hide the
code layout of a randomized binary, and restricts the control flow
to a benign execution path. This allows us to i) implicitly restrict
control-flow targets to basic block entries without requiring the
extraction of a control-flow graph, ii) achieve execution integrity
within legitimate basic blocks, and iii) hide the underlying code
layout under malicious read access to the program. Our analysis
demonstrates that Scylla is capable of preventing state-of-the-art
attacks such as just-in-time return-oriented programming (JIT-
ROP) and crash-resistant oriented programming (CROP). We
extensively evaluate our prototype implementation of Scylla and
show feasible performance overhead. We also provide details on
how this overhead can be significantly reduced with dedicated
hardware support.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instruction set randomization (ISR) [1], [2], [3], [4] is
a countermeasure initially proposed with the objective of
preventing code injection attacks. ISR provides a unique
instruction set for every program by encrypting its underlying
instructions at the binary level. This defense is effective against
code injection because only properly encrypted instructions
will execute on an ISR protected system. Rather than executing
directly, injected code would first be decrypted and then exe-
cuted. In practice, this results in an illegal instruction sequence
being executed that causes the program to crash. With the onset
of data execution prevention (DEP), however, code-injection
style attacks became less practical. Instead, adversaries shifted
to code-reuse attacks (CRAs) as their primary method of
exploitation.
Rather than executing injected code, CRAs craft malicious
computations by stitching together code chunks (gadgets)
already resident in the executable segments of a process.
ISR is not an effective defense against CRAs because its
payload has already been correctly encrypted. Malicious reuse
of existing instructions in an ISR protected application results
in the correct decryption and execution of those instructions.
To make matters worse, CRAs are not easily prevented as
recent research [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] has
demonstrated. These attacks are capable of bypassing state-of-
the-art protections, including address-space layout randomiza-
tion [14], Google’s IFCC [15], and Microsoft’s EMET [16].
Prior defenses aimed at preventing CRAs can be loosely
categorized into software diversity [17], [18], [19], control-
flow integrity [20], [21], and information hiding [22], [23],
[24], [25]. Software diversity attempts to prevent the adversary
from learning the code or data layout of a program by random-
izing program segments, such as the base address of shared
libraries [14]. Control-flow integrity limits the attacker from
arbitrarily manipulating the instruction pointer by checking
that every transfer aligns with a pre-computed control-flow
graph of the program [26]. Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) and
information hiding techniques attempt to prevent leakage of
code or data by isolating sensitive structures, such as code
pointers or executable pages in protected memory regions [25],
[18]. However, as we elaborate in Section IX, each of these
defense strategies have their strengths and weaknesses. Until
now, there exists no proposal that unifies their individual
strengths into one framework to tackle the threat of code-reuse
attacks.
Goals and Contributions. In this paper, we present Scylla,
a defense that updates ISR to provide measurable protection
against code-reuse attacks. It combines the salient features
of software diversity, control-flow integrity, and information
hiding approaches to reliably protect against adversaries that
reuse or disclose the code layout of a vulnerable application.
The core feature of Scylla is a new form of ISR that combines
fine-grain code diversification with per-basic-block encryption
to hide the code layout of a randomized binary, while at the
same time restricting control flow to a benign execution path.
This allows us to achieve what we call execution integrity
within legitimate basic blocks. Execution integrity offers pro-
tection similar to coarse-grain control-flow integrity without
the need to statically or dynamically compute a control-
flow graph. Scylla also affords complete read-access to a
vulnerable program without revealing the underlying code, due
to per-basic-block encryption, or its layout due to basic block
diversification. To the best of our knowledge, Scylla is the first
defense that demonstrates how ISR can be extended to protect
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against code-reuse attacks.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Per-Basic-Block ISR: we present a new form of ISR that
offers protection against CRAs and prevents disclosure of
the underlying code layout, including its information and
control flow, under complete read-access to the program.
• Execution Integrity: we present a novel and practical
protection technique to prevent an adversary from hijack-
ing benign control flow.
• Prototype Implementation: we provide a fully-working
prototype implementation for x86 64 systems that is also
capable of handling shared libraries.
• Extensive Evaluation: we provide an extensive security
and performance evaluation. We show that Scylla is
resilient to traditional ROP, JIT-ROP [5], CFB [9], [8],
and CROP [6]. Our performance measurements show
that our system only incurs 20% overhead, despite the
complexity of Scylla’s hybrid defense. We also discuss
hardware extensions in Section VIII to further reduce the
overhead.
II. INSTRUCTION SET RANDOMIZATION
Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) was initially proposed
by Gaurav et al [1] with the objective of countering code-
injection attacks. A static key is utilized to encrypt the entire
binary, which is stored as part of the header of the executable
file and loaded into the kernel. Subsequent accesses to the key
are done by the operating system only.
To account for possible deficiencies in utilizing a single
key per cipher block, another ISR approach was proposed
by Barrantes et al in [2] that utilizes a one time pad (OTP)
to encrypt memory. The OTP key is generated by a random
number generator. Although the platform can be exploited by
disclosing the unprotected key file, the work presented by
Sovarel et al in [27] demonstrates a stronger attack by showing
that it is only necessary to obtain the key for some parts of
the memory to compromise the entire system.
The system in [2] was extended by Portokalidis et al in [4]
to add support for dynamic libraries, key management, and
forgoes the utilization of an emulator, opting instead to use
Intel’s PIN tool. Memory protection is added for writes to
avoid an attacker overriding the callbacks used by PIN in
order to leak information or obtain arbitrary code execution
in the system. Memory reads are not protected, allowing for
encrypted page leakage and key leakage at runtime.
Since previous software based approaches exhibited large
performance overhead a hardware-supported solution, called
ASIST [28], was presented to overcome this. They demon-
strated a significant reduction in performance, only 1.5% on
average, with minimal additional hardware.
Updating ISR for Code-Reuse Attacks. We note that past
ISR defenses were designed with the prevention of code
injection attacks in mind. They do not prevent code-reuse
attacks as control flow can be redirected to any encrypted
instruction and it will be decrypted correctly. In this work we
improve upon ISR by encrypting a program in basic blocks,
which allows us to implicitly enforce coarse-grained control-
flow integrity.
III. THREAT MODEL
We assume an adversary equipped with a memory corrup-
tion vulnerability, which allows arbitrary read operations to
any mapped memory page of the process. We also allow the
attacker to perform arbitrary writes to the data space of the
process. We do not allow the modification or injection of
code in memory as we assume code to be protected through
DEP [29]. We also assume the attacker has access to an
unprotected binary as a reference, but does not know the in-
memory code layout of the executing victim process partly
due to ASLR [14], but also because of Scylla’s protection.
We assume that the attacker’s goal is to statically or dy-
namically reveal code pages to discover the code layout and
craft a code-reuse attack. The attacker can follow code pointer
references in the application’s data memory, dynamic linking
segments such as the global offset table (GOT) or through the
dynamic disassembly of code pages. We consider a successful
attack against Scylla to be one that reliably discloses the
diversification secrets. The attacker can then use the secrets
to hijack the program’s control flow for malicious purposes,
such as disabling DEP to execute injected code. We do not
consider data-flow based attacks, wherein the attacker modifies
key pieces of data in memory to obtain an alternate but legal
control flow.
To summarize, our threat model is in line with previous
research on ISR, but additionally considers the important class
of code-reuse attacks as its main defense target.
IV. SCYLLA DESIGN
Scylla extends Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) to pro-
tect against code-reuse attacks. Classic ISR was designed with
code injection attacks in mind. The design does not readily
translate to protecting against code-reuse attacks (CRA), since
instructions under classic ISR are decrypted correctly regard-
less of their position in program code. Scylla, therefore, incor-
porates the notion of an execution path within a basic block.1
In particular, each instruction within a basic block is decrypted
with respect to its predecessors. This guarantees sequential
execution from a basic block’s unique entry to its unique
exit. We call this protection execution integrity. Scylla further
addresses known plain-text to cipher-text attacks, of which
past ISR approaches were vulnerable [27], by diversifying the
code layout.
Scylla protects applications from code layout disclosure,
recovery of the program’s underlying information and control
flow, and control flow hijacking. Scylla applies fine-grained
code diversification by permuting functions [30] and basic
blocks [31] within functions, as well as inserting dummy
instructions [32] to prevent disclosure of the program’s layout
in memory. To hide the program’s underlying information and
1We consider a basic block to be any sequential code sequence with a
unique entry and unique exit and use this definition throughout the paper.
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Fig. 1: System overview. Our compiler and build-tools generate a diversified application using function and basic block permutation, as well as dummy
instruction insertion. The code is then encrypted using a stream cipher over basic blocks. In the execution environment, code pages are always encrypted in
memory. Basic blocks are decrypted live before being forwarded to the CPU.
control flow, Scylla encrypts all code pages utilizing a stream
cipher over every basic block in the program. Instructions
are decrypted as they are scheduled to be executed, closing
the threat of dynamic disassembly via an attacker controlled
arbitrary read. Implicit control-flow integrity, or execution
integrity, is supported by implementing per-basic-block en-
cryption which constrains control flow to function and basic
block entries.
Figure 1 shows the major design components of Scylla.
The program is first diversified by permuting the locations
of functions in the code segment. Then, basic blocks inside
functions are permuted and dummy instructions inserted into
those basic blocks. After diversifying the application, we
encrypt every basic block using a stream cipher. The execution
environment ensures that the protected application is always
encrypted in memory. Encrypted instructions scheduled for
execution are decrypted using the stream cipher as they enter
the CPU. Plain-text instructions are forwarded to the CPU
and execute normally. Decrypted instructions are never written
back to memory and read access to code pages return cipher-
text. We describe each component in detail below.
Fine Grained Code Randomization: Scylla combines sev-
eral diversification techniques to complement in-place code
encryption. In the following we explain how we combine
function permutation, basic block reordering, and the insertion
of dummy instructions to diversify the binary layout of the
protected program. While all of these techniques have been
previously proposed [17], [31], [33], combining them is chal-
lenging and has not been done before.
First, we permute function locations to hinder disclosure
attacks that reveal the program’s layout by reading code
pointers in data pages. Usually, an adversary with arbitrary
read capabilities is able to correlate code pointers with target
instructions. By leveraging function permution, we reduce this
capability of the attacker to guessing.
Second, we permute basic blocks within functions to con-
ceal the function layout. This has two effects: on the one
hand, it increases the complexity of our diversification by
adding another layer of randomization. On the other hand, this
protects the encrypted program from known plain-text attacks.
For instance, if a function entry is discovered the attacker can
correlate the encrypted instructions against her local copy to
compute the key. However, this cannot be achieved without
knowledge of the basic block ordering.
Third, we randomly distribute dummy instructions within
basic blocks, altering address offsets and instruction ordering
within a basic block. Dummy instruction insertion also com-
plements Scylla’s encryption mechanism by concatenating a
random string to the program. In this case, the type (i.e.,
mov, add, push/pop, nop), number, and distribution
of inserted instructions within a basic block make-up the
random string.
The security guarantees offered by Scylla are not tied to
diversification alone, but to the combination of randomization
with per-basic-block encryption. Disclosure of a single, or
several, function or basic block entries does not reveal the
surrounding code layout when the program is diversified.
However, an adversary can recover portions of the code layout,
or even the whole code layout, by exploiting the techniques
described in Section IX. In this case, per-basic-block code
encryption complements diversification by ensuring that the
control flow of the program can only target valid basic block
entries and that the code residing at the disclosed addresses
remains concealed as cipher-text.
Per-Basic-Block Instruction Encryption: After randomizing
the binary, we encrypt the program to hide the underlying
code layout and enforce execution integrity. The purpose of
this additional protection is to force the control flow to the
unique entry and exit points of a basic block to prevent control
flow hijacking. In particular, Scylla encrypts every basic block
in the program using a stream cipher. This guarantees that in
order to correctly decrypt and execute the application, control
flow must target the unique entry point of a basic block and
execute sequentially to its terminating control flow instruction.
This form of implicit control flow integrity due to Scylla’s
encryption method is what we have called execution integrity.
Scylla’s encryption combined with diversification also protects
against disclosure because reading the code location does
not reveal any other information about the surrounding code
layout. In fact, an adversary would need to break the underly-
ing encryption to reveal the program’s in-memory layout, as
directly reading code pages only returns cipher-text.
Runtime Decryption: As depicted in Figure 1, instructions
are decrypted as they are fetched by the CPU. This ensures
that no instruction is ever in plain-text in main memory or
any of level of the shared cache hierarchy. When a control
flow instruction is encountered, the execution environment
reseeds the stream cipher for the next basic block. Scylla’s
execution environment guarantees that the underlying code
layout, including its information and control flow, remains
hidden from an adversary. Hijacking control flow must occur
along existing control flow paths within the program in order
to decrypt instructions correctly.
V. ARCHITECTURE
In the following, we describe our architecture for Scylla’s
fine-grained randomization and code encryption mechanism
in detail. To randomize the binary, we modify the LLVM
compiler infrastructure [15] to generate a diversified program
that supports per-basic-block instruction encryption by permut-
ing functions, reordering basic blocks within functions, and
randomly distributing dummy instructions within basic blocks.
We note that source code is not a strong requirement for
randomization, and that similar diversification techniques have
already been applied at the binary level [31], [34]. However,
for our proof-of-concept we chose to leverage the extensive
functionality of LLVM for program transformation and ease
of implmementation. For Scylla’s encryption mechanism, we
extend standard tools for binary manipulation on Linux.
Fine Grained Code Randomization: We permute functions,
and then basic blocks within functions, to improve the cache
pressure that might otherwise be incurred if basic blocks were
randomly distributed across the entire executable. Although
this reduces the entropy of the randomization, we reason that
this decision does not sacrifice security. In Section VI we
demonstrate that the number of possible permutations using
the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [35] is sufficiently high
to prevent an adversary from revealing the code layout.
We randomly distribute dummy instructions within basic
blocks in the program by selecting from nop instructions,
instruction that move a register onto itself, arithmetic and
logic instruction with an identity element, and pushing and
popping a register from the stack. We include this diver-
sification technique to prevent cipher-text only and known
plain-text attacks to which past ISR approaches have been
susceptible [27]. Launching such an attack against Scylla after
dummy instruction insertion requires an adversary to know the
number, distribution, and type of dummy instructions inserted
within the basic block.
Encrypting Code Pages: Creating a Scylla binary: En-
cryption in our Scylla prototype uses an extended objcopy
program, part of the GNU binutils toolset. Normally,
objcopy is used to copy and translate object files between
different formats. We extend its functionality to output en-
crypted executables using a stream cipher. We gate this func-
tionality with a command line option. When active, code pages
are disassembled as they are copied using libopcode as
the backend for disassembly. Basic blocks are then encrypted
using a stream cipher and the encrypted code is written to a
new executable.
Our modified objcopy stores the seeds used in the stream
cipher and the cipher permutation in a new section of the
binary. This section, named .encseeds, is flagged as non-
allocatable, which means that the loader will not store it in
memory. Our execution environment (see Section V) utilizes
the information within this section to decrypt the binary live
as it runs.
Scylla’s encryption capabilities facilitate our principle of
execution integrity by ensuring that instructions are executed
in the way they were intended. This is achieved by encrypting
every instruction with respect to its predecessor using a stream
cipher; the first instruction in a basic block chain is encrypted
with respect to a seed. Previous code encryption approaches
encrypt code pages regardless of instruction sequences and
were therefore unable to protect against code reuse attacks.
Scylla’s encryption model applies to standalone, well-
formed basic blocks. This is deliberate in order to avoid
whole program analysis and recovery of a program’s complete
execution path in order to correctly manage encryption keys.
Instead, Scylla circumvents this and simplifies key manage-
ment by using a single key to encrypt the first instruction
at a control flow target. This simplification has the side-
effect of allowing Scylla to implicitly handle problematic
code constructs, including calls to library functions and signal
handlers, e.g., by using key initialization on basic block entry.
Scylla does not currently support JIT code generation.
Each encryption chain is terminated when a control flow
instruction is encountered. For alignment purposes, compilers
may issue dummy instructions as padding at the end of a
function. As such, the entry point of an ensuing function may
not immediately follow a control flow instruction. To avoid
missed basic blocks during the encryption process, we have
objcopy read the symbol table of the executable and look
for function entries, and encrypt them to ensure correctness in
the process.
Key Generation: For our prototype implementation, we utilize
a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to generate a
key stream for our stream cypher. We utilize the Advanced
Encryption Standard in Counter Mode (AES-CM) to generate
keys. Since the largest acceptable x86 64 instruction at the
time of writing is 15 bytes wide, we utilize AES-CM with
a 128 bit block size and ignore the uppermost byte for the
encryption of instructions. AES-CM proves to be sufficiently
resilient for our purposes. We seed the AES-CM engine with
a key and initialization vector on every basic block entry. Our
counter function is a simple increment by one.
Runtime Wrapper: To the best of our knowledge, there
is no commercially available platform capable of decrypting
instructions as they are executed. In prior instruction set
randomization schemes [1], [2], [3], [4] dynamic binary instru-
mentation tools, such as Dynamic RIO or Intel PIN, have been
used to perform live decryption. However, Dynamic RIO and
Intel PIN share their own address space with the binary they
are instrumenting. Under our attacker model, this means that
the diversification and encryption secrets can be directly leaked
using memory disclosures. Although these disclosures can be
prevented by checking the locations from where a memory
read is taking place, it would not be a realistic emulation
of the necessary hardware to accomplish the task of runtime
decryption.
System emulators such as QEMU or MARSSx86 are pos-
sible alternatives to the implementation, but come with their
own set of challenges. These tools act as hypervisors and as
such come with the requirement of a guest operating system.
Coupled with this requirement is the need to handle multitask-
ing and applications that do not support our scheme. As such,
a great deal of modification would be required for a testing
platform based on these tools. QEMU is capable of running
applications emulating a full system’s user land without the
requirement of a guest operating system. However, when used
this way, it translates the guest program’s instructions to native
code and caches it in a set of translation blocks. Although this
technique is used to improve runtime performance, it would
be in direct violation of our requirement of keeping all code
pages encrypted in memory.
Consequently, we developed a prototype simulator for
Scylla which closely resembles our proposed hardware model.
The simulator consists of three major components: a Launcher,
Monitor, and Encrypted Process. When invoking the simulator,
the Launcher process runs first. The Launcher reads the
contents of the .encseeds section and obtains the seeds for
the stream cipher and the permutation applied to it. At this
point, the Launcher spawns a child process which requests
to be traced using the ptrace() facilities of the Linux
kernel. The child then spawns the Encrypted Process and
waits for the parent, which has been converted to a Monitor.
The Monitor process proceeds to trace the execution of the
Encrypted Process until the latter terminates.
Algorithm 1 delineates the operation of the Monitor process.
As long as the Encrypted Process is in a runnable state, the
Monitor obtains the program counter of the child and fetches
15 bytes from that address into a local buffer. If the last
instruction executed by the Encrypted Process was a control
flow instruction, the Monitor reseeds the stream cipher with
information obtained from the Loader process, otherwise, the
Monitor forwards the stream cipher to the next state. The data
stored in the local buffer is then decrypted using a key obtained
from the stream cipher. The Monitor decodes the instruction
while keeping record of the instruction type, and writes the
decrypted instruction to the Encrypted Process’ code segment
at the location of the program counter and singlesteps it. This
allows the Encrypted Process to execute one instruction at a
time. The Monitor then writes back the encrypted buffer into
the Encrypted Process as it would otherwise leave portions of
code as plain-text in memory.
Our simulator closely resembles the operations a hardware-
based implementation would take. In a Linux-based system,
the kernel reads the sections of an executable and allocates
Algorithm 1 Monitor process operation. The Monitor Process
singlesteps through the Encrypted Process decrypting instruc-
tions as they are about to be executed.
1: while child is running do
2: pc← child%rip
3: buf ← child.text @ pc
4: if last isns is cflow then
5: Reseed stream cipher
6: else
7: Forward stream cipher
8: end if
9: buf ← buf ⊕ key
10: Decode instruction
11: child.text @ pc ← insn
12: Singlestep child
13: buf ← buf ⊕ key
14: child.text @ pc ← buf
15: end while
them in memory as needed. The kernel can be extended to
perform the tasks of our Loader process. Load-time encryption
can be achieved by extending the kernel loader. The Monitor
process simulates a combination of a hardware decryption
unit and kernel process manager. As instructions are fetched,
they are decrypted using the stream cipher by a hardware
module in the front-end. This hardware module handles, in
conjunction with the kernel, context switches and multitasking.
Much like in our execution wrapper model, the Encrypted
Process is unable to leak secrets from the Monitor because a
hardware-based model keeps the secrets by enforcing memory
separation.
Since our simulator runs as a user space process, we provide
support for dynamic linking by exploiting the workings of
the dynamic loader in UNIX-based systems. Before launching
the encrypted application, we set the LD_LIBRARY_PATH
environment variable in the child process and point it to a path
where the encrypted libraries reside. The child application also
requests an encrypted resolver. A library function call proceeds
in much the same fashion as in a normal system. The resolver
gives priority to the encrypted libraries located in the directory
specified by LD_LIBRARY_PATH. The only information that
is needed are the seeds used by the stream cipher to decrypt
the library and loader information. This is obtained from the
.encseeds section of the object files. We then tie the seeds
to the address range of the library and allow execution to
proceed as normal. As such, encrypted libraries can be freely
shared across applications that use them in a rich operating
system environment.
The simulator also allows us to monitor other aspects of the
child process, such as the time that was spent during execution,
and the stream of instructions being executed. We profile a
set of applications from the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark and
discuss results in Section VIII.
VI. SECURITY EVALUATION
We perform our security evaluation assuming that the at-
tacker’s goal is to disassemble enough code pages, or infer
enough code locations, to craft a code-reuse attack (CRA).
As such, we analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of our
scheme in relation to an adversary equipped with a memory
vulnerability that allows disclosure of the program’s address
space and the ability to arbitrarily redirect control flow of
a program to any chosen target. This is in line with recent
work [31], [36], [25], [18], [37]. Following standard cryp-
tographic protocols, we assume that the attacker knows the
workings of the underlying implementation of our stream
cipher, but does not know the keys and IVs used to seed the
pseudorandom number generator.
Code-Reuse Attack Payload: As mentioned in Section III,
we assume that the attacker cannot modify or inject code
in memory due to data execution prevention (DEP). Because
of this, almost all real-world CRAs aim at disabling DEP
and launch a code-injection attack thereafter. Particularly,
we assume an adversary, who is equipped with a memory-
disclosure vulnerability. Usually, this allows bypassing even
fine-grain diversification and chaining function or basic block
gadgets to construct an attack that disables DEP. However, to
bypass Scylla, the attacker would still need to break the per-
basic-block encryption to perform useful operations within the
process. Scylla provides built-in protection in this scenario
because it always expects to decrypt encrypted instructions.
This holds despite the permissions of the process.
Traditional ROP: Traditional ROP utilizes known gadgets in
the program’s code and chains them either using a dispatcher
gadget, as in the case of jump-oriented programming [38],
[39], or by corrupting return addresses found on the stack [40].
Gadgets are any sequence of instructions found within basic
blocks that end with an indirect branch instruction. Because
the x86 64 instruction set allows unaligned instructions, gad-
gets need not be made of intended instructions but can be
made from partially decoded instructions.
Scylla protects against control flow redirection to arbitrary
instructions inside a basic block. This is achieved by encrypt-
ing basic blocks with a stream cipher until the terminating
control flow instruction on the basic block is found. During
encryption, as new instructions are encountered in the basic
block, the key scheduler is forwarded and a new key is
utilized to encrypt the instruction. During execution, when a
new basic block is entered, instructions are decrypted in a
similar fashion. Redirecting control flow to the middle of a
basic block results in instructions being decrypted with the
wrong key. This results in the CPU executing instructions in a
pseudostochastic fashion that eventually causes the program to
crash. Previous analysis demonstrates that an average of four
to five instructions is sufficient to terminate a process [2].
An attacker who intends to perform a traditional ROP attack
would need to reverse the stream cipher in order for malicious
control flow redirection to work. With our usage of AES-CM,
the attacker must know the secret key and initialization vector
used to seed the AES engine in order to deduce the keys for
decryption. Our usage of AES-CM ensures sufficiently secure
pseudorandom numbers to encrypt a program in memory.
Control-Flow Bending: Control-flow Bending [9] (CFB) is a
recent attack that bypasses CFI protection assuming an ideal
CFI policy is in place with relaxations in the enforced control
flow graph. In a CFB attack, an adversary corrupts a code
pointer to call a valid function entry, as determined by the
CFI policy. The callee must also contain a vulnerability which
allows the attacker to corrupt the return address, pointing to
any call-preceded site. This allows the attacker to bend control
flow maliciously and craft any arbitrary exploit. However,
Scylla employs fine-grained diversification with per-basic-
block code encryption to prevent the attacker from locating
call-preceded targets. This attack further requires the adversary
to locate a vulnerable function in the program allowing her
to overwrite a return address. As discussed, our protection
efficiently prevents knowledge of the underlying information
and control flow of the program as well as its code layout
due to the combination of fine-grain code diversification with
per-basic block encryption.
JIT-ROP: JIT-ROP [5] is a powerful class of attacks against
fine-grained randomization techniques. In particular, these
attacks exploit the disclosure of a single code pointer to adjust
their ROP payload to the randomized program layout and
gadget search space at runtime. This enables an adversary
to also defeat load-time based defense approaches that re-
randomize the application program space layout per execution.
We discuss the two main types of JIT-ROP and how they are
handled by Scylla.
Conventional JIT-ROP [5] disassembles code pages while
keeping a collection of gadgets found during disassembly. Any
code pointer, as part of a direct call or a direct jump, is used to
find new code pages, bypassing the diversification applied to
the program. However, under Scylla, any read performed from
a code page yields cipher-text. Although the code page itself
is readable, it cannot be readily disassembled without being
able to break the encryption. As such, an attacker is unable
to utilize conventional JIT-ROP to disclose new code pages or
find gadgets in the binary.
JIT-ROP can be extended to use only code pointers disclosed
from data pages, or indirect disclosure, as the pivot point
to start a disassembly chain of code pages [41]. Although
Scylla does not fully protect against indirect disclosure, it does
prevent disclosure of the entire program due to the underlying
encryption. Scylla’s protection prevents such a vulnerability
from revealing the surrounding code layout because of fine-
grain code diversification combined with per-basic-block en-
cryption.
The indirect disclosure of function entries or basic blocks
provides the attacker with potential gadget locations inside ba-
sic blocks. To tackle this type of disclosure, other approaches
such as Readactor [18] utilize trampolines to hide the location
of basic blocks, eliminating any indirect disclosures of gadgets
inside them. Scylla, on the other hand, prevents the usage of
those gadgets via execution integrity. Arbitrary redirection of
control flow to gadgets within a basic block results in the
execution of incorrectly decrpyted instructions, causing the
program to crash. As such, Scylla is able to forgo the usage of
trampolines and the separation of code from data. Furthermore,
an attacker who discloses a basic block is faced with the same
problem encountered when attempting to disclose new code
pages with conventional JIT-ROP, breaking the encryption. We
show that this requires knowledge of the secrets behind the
key scheduler, which proves to be infeasible as described in
Section VII.
For future work, we plan to extend our protection mech-
anism to better conceal code pointers in memory to avoid
indirect memory disclosure. Scylla could be extended to
encrypt vtable pointers and vtables and decrypting them as
they are about to be used. Futhermore, we will investigate
novel ways to perform load time randomization of binaries
and more efficient methods to encrypt instructions in memory.
Crash-Resistant Oriented Programming: Crash Resistant
Oriented Programming (CROP) [6] is a powerful attack ca-
pable of bypassing fine-grained randomization, information
hiding, and control-flow integrity protection on client-side ap-
plications. This attack exploits mishandled exception handling
and system call behavior to scan memory without crashing,
transforming these crash resistant primitives into so called
memory oracles allowing the adversary to infer accessible
memory boundaries. Combining these two techniques, the
authors demonstrate the ability to locate unreachable memory
regions such as the thread and process environment block
in Windows systems, reference-less memory regions such as
the safe regions in code-pointer integrity (CPI) [25], subvert
hidden code pages by locating export symbols or trampolines
addresses used in Readactor [18], and discover functions or
valid return targets within a control flow path.
Although Scylla does not prevent an attacker from reading
code pages using a memory oracle, any reads performed from
code pages return cipher-text. Due to both the key permutation
and code diversification techniques offered by our protection,
correlating plain-text to cipher-text is infeasible. It could be
reasoned that an attacker could use a crash-resistant memory
oracle to redirect control flow into the cipher-text to locate
valid control flow targets. However, the memory oracles used
in CROP are only resistant to crashes from segmentation faults.
Memory oracles do not handle bus errors or illegal instruction
faults, which are the main causes of program termination under
Scylla’s protection when unintended instruction sequences are
executed.
Comparison with Binary CFI: Our goal is to protect an
application against sophisticated code-reuse attacks through
an instrumentation on the binary level. This means that
Scylla does not require the source code of the protected pro-
gram and is applicable to a large range of software. While for
our proof-of-concept solution we chose to diversify programs
using the LLVM compiler for ease of implementation, source
code is not a strong requirement [31], [34]. Furthermore, even
though control-flow integrity (CFI) [26] was initially proposed
as a compiler extension, this has been extended to the binary
level as well [42], [20]. However, these extensions have been
shown to be vulnerable to attacks because of their relaxed
CFI policies [12], [43], [44]. These policies are due to the
inherent difficulty of reconstructing an accurate control flow
graph (CFG) of a program from its binary representation.
Our approach improves upon the inherent limitations of
binary CFI schemes, because Scylla does not require a CFG of
the protected program as input. Instead, we protect the applica-
tion through a combination of per-basic-block encryption and
randomization to restrict program execution to the intended
path at runtime. More importantly, our security guarantees do
not depend on the asserted precision of such a graph.
Similar to other defenses deployed on the binary level,
we do not cover attacks such as counterfeit object-oriented
programming (COOP) [11], or whole-function reuse at the
moment. However, we are currently investigating the possi-
bilities of offering a protection against these kinds of attacks
within our scheme with added vtable and function protection
through trampolines, as proposed by Readactor++ [37].
VII. ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTION AND DIVERSIFICATION
Probability of Guessing Basic Blocks: Encrypting basic
blocks using a stream cipher provides an adversary with the
possibility of maliciously chaining the execution of basic
blocks. To maliciously chain execution, an attacker must
disclose the location of the necessary basic blocks. Thus, we
focus on the probability of an attacker locating a chosen basic
block.
Scylla randomizes the layout of a binary and then ap-
plies encryption over basic blocks, which provides protection
against direct disclosure of code. An attacker reading from
code is only able to obtain cipher-text and has no knowl-
edge of the underlying instruction stream because of the
randomization. For our prototype, we ensure that the layout of
the resulting binary differs substantially throughout different
compilations. Because we randomize function locations and
reorder basic blocks within a given binary, the amount of
entropy directly depends on the number of functions and basic
blocks in a binary.
We reason that by performing direct disclosures of code
pages, an attacker would theoretically be able to locate an
individual basic block with a probability of 1/
∑m
i=1 ni where
m is the number of functions in a program and ni the
number of basic blocks in function i. Load-time random-
ization for a process of m functions and ni basic blocks
in function i provides the maximum theoretical entropy for
our randomization scheme, given by (
∑m
i=1 ni)!. However,
cache locality is lost during execution and a higher penalty
is paid in performance because of the distribution of basic
blocks under this randomization scheme. We find that this is
unneccessary, as we are still able to obtain a large amount of
entropy without significantly degrading cache performance by
randomizing function locations and positions of basic blocks
within them. The entropy provided under this scheme is given
by m!×∏mi=1 ni!.
Therefore, in practice, the probability of an adversary locat-
ing an individual basic block through direct disclosure can be
estimated as 1/(nav×m), where m is the number of functions,
and nav is the average number of basic blocks per functions.
Using data obtained from the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks,
Table I, we compute the probability of finding a basic block
and correlate it to the size of the code space of the benchmarks.
This is shown in Figure 2. As expected, the probability of
guessing a particular basic block decreases as the size of the
code segment increases. Generally speaking, larger binaries
will contain a higher number of basic blocks. An attacker
exploiting a large binary with a small number of basic blocks
will be faced with basic blocks that have large side effects,
which is detrimental to a CRA.
Name Mean #BB/FN #FN Size in Bytes
astar 7.5 213 55K
bzip2 28.5 100 94K
gcc 30 5577 3.3M
gobmk 11.65 2679 3.8M
h264ref 35.33 590 609K
hmmer 21 538 348K
libquant 10 115 82K
mcf 21.74 24 62K
omnetpp 4.35 602 885K
sjeng 39.8 144 182K
xalan 6 5653 8.2M
TABLE I: SPEC2006 basic block statistics. Mean #BB/FN
denotes the average number of basic blocks per function. #FN
denotes the number of functions in the binary. The number of
permutation for function shuffling combined with per function
basic block randomization is computed as m!×∏mi=1 n!, where
m is the number of functions and n is the number of basic
blocks.
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Fig. 2: Probability of disclosing function and basic block entries.
Scylla also provides a mechanism to keep similar basic
blocks from being identified by inserting dummy instructions
within basic blocks, then encrypting them. This provides
an extra layer of obfuscation against direct direct memory
disclosure because the original program has effectively been
concatenated with a random string. With dummy instructions
inserted into a program an attacker is unable to perform fre-
quency analysis in leaked cipher-texts to identify basic blocks,
or perform known plain-text attacks without first knowing their
distribution.
Attacker Obtains A Basic Block We now discuss the effects
of the attacker being able to obtain a basic block. Although
this is not possible using direct disclosure of a code pointer, an
attacker may still be able to obtain some manner of basic block
information by disclosing code pointers such as those found
in the GOT, vtables or return addresses stored in the stack. We
perform an analysis of what can be done with this information
under two circumstances: the attacker does not have matching
plain-text, and the attacker has a matching plain-text.
Attacker does not have matching plain-text: An attacker who
obtains cipher-text, but does not have matching plain-text may
attempt to study the behavior of the program by altering a code
pointer to force execution from an adjacent location. Upon
executing this new code path, the decryption mechanism will
return incorrect instructions. The attacker can then observe any
side effects caused by this execution path [27]. Previously
reported experimental data shows that the probability of a
meaningful computation under this conditions is small and
that the program will likely crash due to an illegal memory
access or illegal instruction [2].
Furthermore, this type of attack is only reliable if the
program is respawned with the exact randomization features as
before, such as when naively cloning code and data pages from
a parent process without re-encrypting and re-randomizing
them. If the newly loaded code pages use a new seed and key,
then the attacker is unable to perform side-channel analysis
under this scenario.
Attacker has matching plain-text The assumption that an
attacker has a matching plain-text is not unsound. If the
disclosed code pointer is a vtable entry or a GOT entry, for
example, then the attacker can disclose the entry basic block to
a function. The attacker can then attempt to utilize a plaintext
copy of the binary to obtain the encryption secrets.
Under these conditions, the attacker is able to obtain n bits
of the key by performing a bitwise XOR between the first n
bits of the encyrpted block and the first plaintext instruction
in the basic block. The attacker may then attempt to find the
rest of the keys on a basic block by performing subsequent
decryption operations. Using this information, an attacker can
iteratively attempt to reverse the secrets behind the stream
cipher until reaching the basic block’s terminating control
flow instruction and obtain its target address. We randomly
distribute a permutation of dummy instructions within basic
blocks to effectively counter this attack by concatenating a
random string to the plain-text and then generating the cipher-
text.
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Fig. 3: SPEC CPU2006 performance results.
If a predictable key scheduler is used the attacker can
potentially use this information to guess the next key given
dummy instruction insertion. Dummy instructions, such as
nop sleds or moving a register onto itself, can be detected
by the attacker since the key obtained from performing a
bitwise XOR between the plain-text instruction and cipher-text
instruction would not match the expected key. An attacker can
decrypt the entire basic block until reaching the terminating
control flow instruction. At this point, the target address can
be decrypted and a new decryption chain started. This process
is, in effect, an extension to JIT-ROP [5] to discover code
pages by decrypting instructions when using a predictive key
scheduler. However, relying on a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator for key generation ensures
that this type of attack is infeasible.
VIII. PERFORMANCEEVALUATION
To evaluate the performance impact of Scylla, we use
the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite which contains a set
of representative CPU-intensive programs seen in real-world
applications. We use Arch Linux with Linux kernel version
4.8.4 for our evaluation running on an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU
clocked at 3.4GHz, with a 32KiB L1 I/D cache, 8MiB of L3
cache, and 16GB of RAM. We use Scylla’s modified LLVM
compiler to build SPEC with musl-libc and libc++,
rather than glibc and stdlibc++, because LLVM does not
currently support glibc and stdlibc++ library extensions.
We statically link these libraries for our evaluation, but this
is not a requirement as Scylla initializes a key on every
basic block entry which includes entry into library functions.
Because of this we were unable to build the perlbench
and gcc benchmarks as these rely on internals and extensions
provided only by glibc.
We evaluated the compatible benchmarks against native ex-
ecution with both fine-grain diversification only, and with both
diversification and per-basic-block encryption. Each bench-
mark is executed within our execution wrapper and evaluated
by measuring the time taken to execute 250 million instruc-
tions. We limit the instruction count as a way to speed up
data collection, reporting the effective CPI of our protection
mechanism as Scylla’s execution wrapper single-steps through
the program’s code, decrypting instructions live. Time mea-
surements are based on CPU cycles by reading the time-stamp
counter register before and after exuction. A summary of our
results are shown in Figure 3. Overall, we found that Scylla
incurs an average overhead of 20% for SPEC CPU2006.
21.64%
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0.29%
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Fig. 4: Delineation of the average execution times across all SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks with execution wrapper and Scylla protected program.
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Fig. 5: Breakdown of execution times within the wrapper while managing
a Scylla protected program.
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Fig. 6: Performance slowdown in Branch Misprediction and I-Cache Miss rates due to Scylla’s randomization.
Fine Grained Diversification: First, we evaluate the im-
pact of code diversification by itself, computing an average
overhead less than 1%. This performance result agrees with
other fine-grain diversification approaches that randomize ba-
sic blocks [31]. We surmise that the performance slowdown
is due to a combination of imperfect instruction cache locality
because of increased code size as a result of dummy instruction
insertion, or an increase in branch mispredictions due to
both basic block and function permutation. Figure 6 shows
the performance overhead caused by Scylla’s diversification
for both branch mispredictions and the instruction cache
miss rate. Branch misprediction is largely low, and in some
cases improved, but on average incurs a 11% overhead. Both
libquantum and xalan exhibit overheads higher than the
average. Libquantum is a library for simulating a quantum
computer and contains a large number of branches, roughly
26%, so this result is expected. Xalan is an XML processor
and also contains a large number of branches compared to the
other SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks, so it too experiences an
increase in branch mispredictions.
From our evaluation the instruction cache miss rate suf-
fers the most due to Scylla’s diversification. Libquantum,
sjeng, and xalan incur the highest miss rates. Both
libquantum and xalan suffer from poor temporal locality
due to basic block and function permutation combined with a
large number of branch instructions. Prior analysis has demon-
strated that the instruction cache performance is sensitive to
both interpreter (xalan), and artificial intelligence (sjeng)
workloads due to large code footprints that execute over a
wide range of functions [45]. Overall, Scylla’s diversification
causes a 25% increase in instruction cache misses across all
SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks.
Fine Grained Diversification and Instruction Encryption:
We then evaluated Scylla’s full implementation with both code
diversification and er-basic-block encryption features running
within the execution wrapper. On average, the impact in
performance of Scylla incurs a 20% overhead and a worst
case overhead of 22.5%.
Scylla’s prototype implementation uses a execution wrapper
to monitor the encrypted process and decrypt instructions as
they are scheduled to be executed. This includes reading from
the encrypted child process to fetch up to a 15 byte block,
generation of a 128-bit key using Intel’s AES-CM engine,
decryption of the instruction, writing the decrypted instruction
back into the child, executing the instruction in single-step
mode using ptrace(), re-encrypting the instruction, and
then writing the encrypted instruction back into the child. This
is an simulation framework developed to model the security
offered by a hardware-based implementation, which would
place the decryption engine between the instruction cache and
front-end of the CPU ensuring that instructions in the memory
hierarchy would always remain encrypted.
Past instruction set encryption approaches have demon-
strated that a hardware supported solution for runtime de-
cryption significantly reduces this overhead [28]. As our
protection does not conflict with this approach, we argue
that the overhead shown in Figure 3 for both full code
diversification and encryption is misleading in that it is due
primarily to the execution wrapper. Figure 4 delineates the
average execution times for Scylla’s full protection. Roughly
71% of the benchmark execution time is spent within the
execution wrapper, 50% of which is spent within the kernel.
Figure 4 also shows a broken-out plot for the child process
to highlight that less than 1% of the execution time is spent
executing decrypted instruction in user-land.
Figure 5 presents a breakdown of the execution times within
the execution wrapper while managing the full Scylla protected
program. We evaluate the time spent generating the key using
Intel’s AES-CM engine, decrypting and encrypting instruc-
tions, and writing the modified instructions back into the
child process. Everything else within the execution wrapper
including reading from the Scylla protected program, single-
stepping the process, logging execution, and other system
miscellany are included in Other. Our evaluation shows that
key generation, decryption, and encryption represent negligi-
ble executions times, while writing decyrpted and encrypted
instructions back into the child process accounts for the largest
observed execution time.
Discussion: From a hardware perspective, Scylla requires that
a decryption engine decrypts instructions as they are loaded to
L1 I-cache so that no plain-text instructions are resident in the
shared instuction and data cache memory. A storage element is
also necessary to keep the decryption secrets for basic blocks.
During the execution of a process, the decryption engine is
active decrypting instructions as they are loaded by the CPU.
When the CPU is executing in supervisor mode, the decryption
engine can remain inactive if the kernel code is not encrypted.
Otherwise, a secondary decryption engine can be used for
code that runs in priviledged mode. During task switching, the
operating system is responsible for backing up and restoring
the decryption engine’s state and associated secrets. Recent
research has demonstrated the feasibility of implementing this
in hardware with limited additional hardware [28].
With hardware support the decryption engine would be
placed in between the instruction cache and CPU front-
end, ensuring that instructions would remain encrypted in
the instruction cache while executing. Importantly, this would
eliminate the overhead due to both writing decrypted and
encrypted instructions back into the child process and overhead
bundled into the category Other.
IX. RELATED WORK
Previous work on prevention of code-reuse attacks can
be loosely categorized into three categories: diversification,
control-flow integrity, and code pointer integrity and informa-
tion hiding. While each of these mechanisms raise the bar for
attackers, they each have their limitations. We first discuss the
merits and weaknesses of each approach using Figure 7 as a
base.
Software diversification. Software diversification offers prob-
abilistic protection by randomizing the program segments
of an application. Code-reuse attacks are hindered by this
defense because the attacker is forced to guess code locations.
Diversification of program segments ranges from randomizing
the base offset of code and data [14], to shuffling the location
of functions [18], dynamic sections [37], basic blocks [31],
[34], or instructions [36], [46]. These approaches can be
applied statically at compile time or dynamically at load-time
or during program execution [41], [47].
Software diversification defenses, however, are only as
strong as the diversification coverage. As shown in Figure 7a,
completely hiding the code layout of a program has proven
difficult because there are many direct and indirect references
to code locations in memory. In JIT-ROP [5], a single direct
reference to a code location allowed disclosure and disassem-
bly of a significant number of code pages with fine-grained
diversification applied to them. This technique was later shown
to be applicable using indirect code pointers [41].
Control-flow Integrity (CFI). CFI is a general defense against
code-reuse attacks [26] that mitigates control-flow hijacking by
constraining execution to a legitimate control-flow path. It does
so by checking that each control-flow transfer targets a valid
code location as determined by the program’s control-flow
graph (CFG). The accuracy of the statically, or dynamically,
computed CFG determines the precision of the CFI policy.
This largely determines the granularity with which control-
flow checks can be made and the policy’s resilience to attack.
CFI solutions in software, however, typically relax the CFG
coverage in favor of performance resulting in so-called coarse-
grained CFI [42], [20]. Previous work has demonstrated that
relaxation of CFG coverage leaves an application susceptible
to attack [38], [12], [43]. Figure 7b illustrates this point.
The runtime address for the register-indirect call cannot be
computed statically, therefore the policy has instrumented all
targets with the same checking routine. An adversary can
redirect control at to any checking routine with the same
semantics; per Figure 7b to any target that checks label A.
Recent work also calls into question the protection offered by
ideally fine-grained CFI defenses, e.g., a CFI policy supported
by a completely precise CFG, using a technique called control-
flow bending [9].
Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) and Information Hiding. CPI
and information hiding defenses prevent writing or reading
to sensitive memory regions. This ranges from hiding code
pointers in safe memory with strict access control [25], to
hiding them behind access permissions [48], [18]. This defense
affords attackers limited knowledge of the vulnerable applica-
tion’s address space layout and limits arbitrary manipulation
of code pointers. A recent approach [22], called execute-no-
read (XnR) delimits access permission on code pages, marking
them as executable-only. A hardware supported version of
this defense successfully mitigates a wide-range of CRAs that
rely on direct or indirect memory disclosure. Its software
implementation, however, is still susceptible to attack [49].
Much like software diversity and CFI, information hiding
has been shown to be vulnerable to attack. Figure 7c illus-
trates a general approach to bypassing information hiding.
An adversary first gains control of an arbitrary read or write
vulnerability, which then is used to find and corrupt hidden
regions. Later references to the corrupted portions of hidden
memory result in unchecked control-flow hijacking because
the system assumes derefencing code pointers from the hidden
region is safe. JIT-ROP [5] was shown to successfully bypass
Oxymoron [48], a defense that hides direct code pointers using
Intel’s segment selector registers, by leaking indirect code
pointers on virtual tables. An attack was also demonstrated
against CPI by leaking its safe memory region using timing
side-channels [13].
Related Approaches. Besides instruction-set randomization
(see Section II), another work that bears some resemblance
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(c) Information hiding relies on the separation of code pointers from
regular data. Disclosing this area of memory makes the approach
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Fig. 7: Different defense mechanisms against code reuse attacks and their bypasses. In this figure, pages shaded as are marked as readable and executable.
Pages shaded as are flagged as readable and writable. Pages shaded as are hidden from the attacker, but readable and writable.
to ours is Isomeron [41]. Isomeron tolerates complete code
memory disclosure using clones (isomers) of functions within
a program. A cloned function is first diversified and then,
on each control-flow instruction, a “coin-flip” decides which
control-flow target will be executed, the original or clone. As
the attacker is unaware of which code will execute, crafting
a control-flow hijacking attack becomes unreliable. In that
work, it is mentioned that combining ISR with diversification
incurs an unacceptable overhead. However, we have shown
that the runtime overhead of our approach is similar on average
to Isomeron, which incurs a 19% performance increase on
average. As we have demonstrated, the main contribution to
the overhead of our system is due to the execution wrapper,
which is a prototype implementation. With full hardware
decryption support, we would incur overhead due mainly to
our code diversification protection. We also protect against a
larger class of CRAs [5], [9], [6] than Isomeron.
A recent diversification approach from Crane et al. [18],
called Readactor, protects applications from direct and indirect
memory disclosure by combining fine-grained diversity with
code-pointer hiding and execute-no-read (XnR) protection.
They achieve a practical runtime overhead of only 6.4% and
demonstrate a working implementation by protecting the entire
Google Chromium browser and its V8 JIT compiler. Our work
shares many similarities, in particular we incorporate fine-
grained code diversification and support code hiding tech-
niques using encryption of code pages. While we incur a
higher overhead, a key feature of our work, as opposed to
Readactor, is its resilience to CROP [6] style attacks that
infer code locations using crash-resistant memory oracles. As
discussed in Section VI, our approach withstands such an
attack as it is infeasible to disclose the plaintext and construct
a reliable payload under our code diversification and key
permutation scheme even if an adversary has knowledge of
code locations.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce Scylla, the first hybrid defense
incorporating software diversity, control-flow integrity, and
information hiding. We demonstrate how an encryption chain
over basic blocks can be used to achieve execution integrity.
When combined with software diversification techniques and
information hiding, Scylla’s per-basic-block encryption yields
a mechanism that is capable of protecting against a diverse
set of code-reuse attacks under a powerful attacker model. We
also show the applicability of our mechanism to a multitasking
system while demonstrating reasonable performance overhead
when benchmarked with the SPEC CPU2006 suite.
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